The Easter Revolution – 7th April 2010
April 7th, 2010, and once again Kyrgyzstan hits the headlines in the world’s media. Disorder, violence and bloodshed provide good material for journalists.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan was became a “darling of the West” as an “island of democracy” in what seen as a Totalitarian Central Asia. Even Russian officials praised its leadership for its wise economic and national policies. The policies of Askar Akaev, the country’s first President, showed a marked break with the recent communist past and demonstrated, at least at first, both vision and pragmatism. As time passed, however, Kyrgyzstan ran into a host of problems: rampant corruption, sharp social stratification and nepotism. The economy entered a prolonged period of stagnation, and whilst the leadership bathed in a sea of luxury, the people got markedly poorer. Social unrest led to deposition of one president, Akaev, whilst his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiev, and his extended clan behaved like “depraved medieval khans”, (as one Moscow commentator put it), looting the country and exploiting the people, thus sparking the second revolution in the country in a decade.
There have been several different analyses of the origins of the Easter Revolution of April 7th, 2010, and the overwhelming impression they give is one of an extremely complex web of causes which will give future historians a field day as they attempt to unravel them. One analysis likened the situation to a Russian Matrushka doll … with one cause hidden within another.
One commentator, quoting an opposition politician suggests that the Kyrgyz are “the most insubordinate, rebellious, and mutinous nation” in Central Asia, and another who insisted that “it’s harder to govern three Kyrgyz than 300 Uzbeks.”
Another referred to the “social explosion” arising out of a rapid growing and “young” population frustrated by the lack of jobs and economic opportunities, which was further heightened by a turndown in the economy as Kyrgyzstan experienced the effects of the Global Economic Crisis. In fact, Kyrgyzstan was largely shielded from the crisis itself because it was still relatively underdeveloped and not particularly well integrated into the world stack and financial markets which had sparked off the “financial meltdown”. It wasn’t totally insulated from the effects of what was happening outside its borders, however. One particular result was that had a negative impact on the well-being of many people in the country was that remittances from the many Kyrgyz migrant workers in Kazakhstan and Russia began to wither as these countries suffered more directly from the crisis.
The catalyst which sparked the initial protests which eventually led to the events of April 7th was the dissatisfaction, displeasure and discontent felt in population as a whole at the mismanagement by the Bakiev regime of the “multifold increases” in the prices of electricity, heating, and water, and a surcharge imposed for each mobile-phone connection – saying that “Simple math should have prompted the government to realize that not many people would be able to cope with the new prices”. Protests began in the oblasts, regions. First in the weeks preceding the revolution Naryn, and then, the day before in Talas. In Talas, the authorities sent in police reinforcements and the army to control the situation, but this only resulted in a worsening of the situation. There were casualties. There were deaths. The crowd grew in size and anger. Official buildings were seized, taken back and then seized again. The authorities took on the crowd … and lost. The crowd felt “empowered”.
Then the action transferred to Bishkek, where the opposition had planned mass protests for the following day.
If the hardship caused by having to pay the increased tariffs for energy and other services was the initial catalyst, then it should be noted that there were a myriad of other, contributory, causes: corruption and nepotism; the misuse of the massive grant and loan given by the Russians; a “personality cult” with political manipulations in the conduct of elections loading the parliament with supporters of the President and creating new administrative structures which were supposed to work in parallel to the structures extablished in the constitution, such as “traditional kurultai” or people’s councils; measures aimed at the suppression of political activity in a slide towards authoritarianism, including the arrest of political leaders the day before the planned protest, one potential Presidential candidate fleeing the country to seek asylum in the US to escape threats to himself, his wife and family; media clampdowns, which looked like repression, including blocking of internet sites and a serious of suspicious deaths which looked like assassinations, (all of which raised a sense of fear amongst the population).
Then, there was the unseen hand of the Kremlin, displeased by duplicitous dealing over the American airbase at Manas, coupled with demands that Russia also contribute to Kyrgyz coffers in respect to their “base”. Although there had long been gossip about Russian displeasure at events in Kyrgyzstan, they had been adopted a generally supportive approach to the country. The tide seemed to turn in Moscow, however, a few weeks before the revolution. The press carried critical stories about Kyrgyzstan and it’s leadership. There were complaints about Kyrgyzstan buying Russian oil at subsidized prices only to make huge profits by selling it on, (to the Americans?), at much higher world prices. Many supporters of the deposed President blame the Russians for his overthrow, although they and even Bakiev, himself, deny it.
(In contrast to the Russians, the Americans kept a low profile, (at least in public), and seemed to turn a blind eye and even to acquiesce to what were seen as the worst aspects of the Bakiev regime. The perception, in Kyrgyzstan, of their reasons was to avoid “upsetting the applecart” and preserve the arrangements for the Manas airbase which was a vital link in their war effort in Afghanistan.)
The final catalyst, however … the final straw … was probably frustration and anger at the bloodshed as snipers fired on protesters outside the White House on that fateful afternoon.
To many outsiders, the one bright spot was the absence of any extreme racial or religious causes. The ethnic element was to emerge later, sometime after the revolution itself. The fact that there was no apparent involvement of Islamic fundamentalist groups must have brought a huge sigh of relief from all quarters, East and West.
If the causes of the Easter Revolution were manifold, the events turned out to a “Topsy Turvey” Carousel. as I hope these postcards will show.
Bishkek