Osh riots – 1990
Despite the general impression that the Soviet Union was a highly organized and tightly controlled society, it experienced several inter ethnic conflicts, of which the events known as “Osh 1990” was only one. There were, for example, four large scale violent conflicts which erupted in the Caucuses at about the same time.
The events in Osh were on a much smaller scale: reports vary but early estimates of 116 deaths were later revised to 300, (with about 25 bodies not being identified) but some unofficial figures, and general opinion amongst the people who have been willing to talk to me about it, put the figure much higher – as high as 1000. (I have heard even higher estimates – but without supporting justification for such “gossip”.) Forty eight people died in the first four days of rioting in Osh, itself.
Although the riots, themselves, took place in June 1990, problems were evident for those who could read the signs long before this. Apparently the KGB issued nine reports about the potentially explosive situation and growing tensions between the ethnic groups to the regional authorities in the six months between January and June, 1990. Despite the fact that the authorities, both in Osh and Frunze, (Bishkek), were aware of the situation and the growing tensions their responses were weak, ineffective in addressing the issues and even contradictory and, surprisingly, the First Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Khirghiz SSR was to report later that the conflict was “quite unexpected”.
According to the reports, the two sides had been “preparing” for the conflict for several months. Although this might imply an “intent”, opinion is divided about whether the conflict was “premeditated”. Such “preparations” do not necessarily mean that the conflict was actively planned – in detail – but that the situation escalated over a period of time, with different measures taken in each of the communities as a response to each new development, until the outbreak of actual hostilities.
As early as in February, for example, there were incidents where Uzbek’s evicted, or “drove out”, Kyrgyz tenants from their lodgings. It is suggested that their reason may well have been prompted by fear as a result of threats from Uzbek “extremists” to burn down their houses if they did not do so.
The event that is usually regarded as the catalyst which provoked the weeklong outbreak of violence in June, (the flash point which ignited the conflagration), was when the authorities allocated land to the ethnic Kyrgyz group Osh Aimagi, (Osh Land), on the Lenin kolhoz, (collective farm), for the construction of housing units in order to create “a Kyrgyz village” – without consulting the management of the farm of local authorities. The farm was located in a region which basically populated by Uzbeks and discontent amongst the kolhoz inhabitants soon developed into outright opposition – based on ethnic lines.
A crowd of Uzbeks attacked a police station and the situation deteriorated. There was a wave of bloody revenge killings as rumours spread along the lines of: “”Our folk are being beaten and killed” and resulting in the inter ethnic rioting spreading to other towns in the region.
Because the telephone lines remained open in the otherwise blockaded city, news of the violence spread immediately to Frunze. In the capital, a large group of students marched on the headquarters of the Communist Party, which also served as the seat of government, and in the violent confrontation that ensued, personal injuries were minimized by effective crowd control, and the riotous crowd eventually was transformed into a mass meeting.
The events, themselves, involved murder, rape, arson and even what is described by one commentator as “massacre” … in descriptions of the 2010 events the word “genocide” was sometimes used by commentators. Both sides were armed with small bore guns, pistols as well as more prosaic sticks and stones and both sides committed acts of: arson; killing horses; plundering shops and offices; beating and “torturing” people with a variety of implements, (sticks, stones, axes, guns and other hard objects); murder – many of the deaths were inflicted by strangulation, (with wire or rope), and there were instances where the bodies were burnt, apparently in order to prevent identification of the bodies; rape and there were acts of “humiliation and torture” such as parading naked women through in the street.
The majority of the participants who participated in the violent acts were, according to the police, young men in the 20-29 age group.
Eventually, martial law was declared and troops were drafted in from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to restore order, the border with Uzbekistan was closed to prevent the unrest spreading and a curfew imposed in several cities – but the unrest lasted for several weeks and many residents fled to escape the violence: Uzbeks to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz to the North.
It is easy to reduce History to a “chronology of events”, but to understand those events properly, it is necessary to put them into a context … to see the causes that led to them.
The reason for the outbreak of violence that is most often cited was the “housing shortage” – and this often cited as the actual trigger that set off the conflict.
In the 1970’s and 80’s there were many ambitious building projects – especially in the capital, Frunze, (Bishkek). The monumental marble edifices of the White House, the Historical Museum, the National Library, the Philharmonia, the facade of the Ala Too Square all belong to this period. Such grandiose projects, however, provided little residential accommodation – and, by 1990, the housing situation was reaching crisis proportions – especially in the capital, Frunze, (Bishkek), and the densely populated areas of the Ferghana valley.
In Frunze rumours spread that homeless refugees from an earthquake in Armenia were to be allocated housing. In response, people took to the streets to protest. The mood of the crowds in the mass demonstrations was angry, and there were calls for the government to resign, but order was maintained.
In the Osh region there was a huge waiting list for housing – about a sixth of the population, mainly young men and their families. It was in this context that the allocation of land to the Osh Aimagi group on the Lenin kolhoz which led to the outbreak of the conflict.
Although, however, this may well have provided the immediate cause for the riots, it was by no means the only cause, not even the main one.
At the time, the majority of the population in the Osh region, (which represented about the population of the Khirghiz SSR – as it was then), was Kyrgyz – but only just! – 54.6%. The second largest nationality group were the Uzbeks with about that figure, (27.1). The rest of the population was composed of Russians, (who represented about 10% of the population), Tajiks, Ukrainians and a host of other nationalities. This ethnic mix was partly due to the history of the geographical region: the fertile Ferghana valley was part of the Kokand Khanate – basically Uzbek; with nomadic tribes of Kyrgyz shepherds wandering the surrounding mountains; the influx of Russians as the Tsarist empire expanded into Central Asia and continued under the Soviets and forced migrations and deportations, especially under Josef Stalin. The situation had been intensified by immigration from other Soviet Republics, particularly from neighbouring Uzbekistan, which led to concerns at the time that the Kyrgyz would soon be outnumbered by people of other nationalities.
Although it was primarily a conflict between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, (other nationalities seem to have remained neutral, although there were some attempts by community leaders from these other groups to bring about a reconciliation), it shares many features with some of the other conflicts – and had a complex web of causes: difficult social and economic conditions, territorial claims and “access to power”.
Kyrgyzstan had been developing economically very slowly – and most people were involved in the traditionally low paid sector of agriculture and according to some estimates the majority of the population were living close to, or below, the poverty line and the low wages and low standards of living were seen as the main underlying reason behind the outbreak of violence.
It didn’t help the situation that there was a growing proportion of young people in the population – most employed in low-paid jobs and living in hostels.
The high handed nature of the authorities is also seen as a contributing factor – and their links with “the business community” – created a system called the “commercial mafia” and resulted in a corrupt system of granting “mutual aid”. Indeed, the very nature and composition of those various bodies … which, even in the days of the Soviet Union, was creating a divided society between the “haves” and “have nots” is seen as institutionalizing the problem. The majority of the various state organs being Kyrgyz, but the majority of those in trade being Uzbek, introduced an ethnic element to what was a developing socio-economic problem. This situation coincided with a reorganization of some of the authorities – people with close connections with the regional “commercial mafia” were dismissed and replaced with “new faces”. They appealed for support inflaming both nationalist and separatist feelings amongst the different groups of the population.
The reforms initiated by Gorbachev as part of his policy of “glasnost“, (openess), and “perestroika“, (restructuring or rebuilding), brought about many changes which were to have an impact on and a rise in political awareness.
A relatively “free” mass media – “freer”, that is, than in earlier times – was able to promote discussion of subjects that had previously been off-limits, if not taboo, such as: the future of socialist society; ideological pluralism and the national rebirth of the constituent republics. The Central Asian republics and their peoples were losing their fear of Moscow and started to defend their national cultures, languages and heritage whilst reminding Russia of its colonial past.
The were also more able to report dissent and disputes within the Union – shattering the former Communist “myth” of an a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic “paradise on earth”. As ethnically based riots broke out in Almaty in 1986, in which the protestors on the street shouted slogans like “Kazakhstan for the Kazaks”, they were able to report such events openly for for the first time.
The die had been cast – and the mould broken. There were more riots following those in Almaty, for example: one in Western Kazakhstan and then another in Tashkent in 1989.
Also, in this context, people who were amassing wealth wanted and sought the influence that they felt should go with it. Two groups, in particular, emerged in the Osh region: the “National Democratic Front” and “Osh Aimagi” which drew their membership from the Kyrgyz community, (including some 1500 as a result of the “evictions” in the early part of the year), and the “Adalat Union” consisting exclusively of ethnic Uzbeks.
Adalat issued a list of some twenty demands, or “claims”, including the recognition of Uzbek as an “official language”. Some of the Adalat members raised the question of “Uzbek autonomy” within the region in order to cement the power and influence that they felt they were being denied – and some who even promoted the idea of a “separation” from Kyrgyzstan. There was even an appeal to create an autonomous republic sent to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow and the republican Supreme Soviet in Frunze.
In was in this sort of context that the riots erupted.
Ten years later, in 2000, there were a number of journalists, scholars, “experts” and organizations that took a look back at, and reviewed, the events of 1990 – and indulged in a tendency of putting a gloss on the events. Instead of looking at the causes and developments of the conflict, they (understandably) concentrated on the positive signs of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups that were evident at that time.
All was not well, however, and it is with hindsight that we can see that many of the aspects of 1990 were to be repeated in July 2010: the population mix; the predominance of youth; the slow economic progress and resulting low standard of living of the population; the social divisions between the “haves” and “have nots”; the role of the “commercial mafia”; the role playe by rumour; the displaced former officials after a “reorganization” of power and power structures; the desire of the minority for recognition – social, economic, political and for the role of their language and culture; calls for greater autonomy (“local democracy”) and even separatism; the unpreparedness of the authorities and ineffectiveness of their response; the aspirations of the minority community for greater influence and power; the composition of the authorities, police and army … cot to mention – and so on.
Into this melting pot, in 2010, there were additional elements or differences – the role of organized crime, (the more traditional view of the mafia); religious extremism fuelled by the war in Afghanistan and groups like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan; the presence of the international media, but despite this the lack of support from outside – the Kyrgyz authorities appeal for assistance being passed over instead of troops being dispatched to quell the situation and, of course, the recent overthrow of the president and the role of the Uzbek community in supporting the Interim Government … and so on.
One of the interesting things, it seems to me, about this is the lesson about History repeating itself … and the failure to learn the lessons that History tries to teach us.
But, then again, it’s so much easier to draw conclusions given the benefit of hindsight.
This page is a revised version of an earlier page which was much shorter … as it was originally written as part of another piece, with another purpose, but I decided to include it here as part of the “Living in Interesting Times” section of the site following the Easter Revotution on April 7th 2010 (See The Easter Revolution – 7th April, 2010). Since the events in Osh in July 2010, (see The “Fire Triangle”), the page received a lot of hits and I started getting questions about had happened. As a result I decide to revise the page.
It is based primarily on the account of events in the article “Ethnic Conflict in the Osh Region in Summer 1990: Reasons and Lessons”, by Abilabek Asankanov, (who was Chairman of the Ethnology Department of History at the Kyrgyz State University in Bishkek), which was published as part of the study “Ethnicity and Power” by the The United Nations University in 1996 . (See: http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee0d.htm)
Bishkek